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I VIEWPOINT I
ERISA and Venture Capital Investing

-

Who Is a "Fiduciary"?
Joseph W. Bartlett*
One of the most significant ERISA' issues with respect to venture capital concerns the status of the manager of those venture
partnerships in which employee benefit plans invest. Are the managers "fiduciaries" under ERISA because they are managing "plan assets" - i.e., the portfolio companies - on behalf of the employee
benefit plan? Or are the "plan assets" not the portfolio companies
but the interests in the venture partnership itself? If the latter view
is adopted, it would lift the "fiduciary" tag from the general partners
of the venture partnership. Viewing the managers of venture partnerships as fiduciaries is inappropriate because of the nature of the
venture business. Venture managers typically share in profits with
their investors and transactions between the manager and pool of
managed funds are not uncommon. The "fiduciary," if any, is that
individual or firm who advises the pension fund to invest in the partnership in the first place. The general partners of the venture are
conceptually akin to the managers of an operating business in which
a pension fund happened to hold stock. They are thus indifferent to
ERISA, in effect.
* Partner, Gaston & Snow, New York City. A.B. 1955, Harvard College; LL.B. 1960,
Stanford Law School. Bartlett is a fellow of the American Bar Foundation and a member of
the American Law Institute. He has served as a law clerk to Chief Justice Earl Warren of the
United States Supreme Court, 1960 term, and as United States Under Secretary of Commerce, 1967-68. The author of THE LAW BUSINESS: A TIRED MONOPOLY (1982) and VENTURE CAPITAL: LAW, BUSINESS STRATEGIES, AND INVESTMENT PLANNING (1988), Bartlett is
also an Adjunct Professor of Law at New York University Law School. This piece was written
in collaboration with J. David Waldman, associate, Gaston & Snow, New York City.
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31 and 42 U.S.C.).
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In late 1986, the Department of Labor (DOL) published a comprehensive regulation addressing this issue.' It became effective in
March 1987 and served, in essence, to "grandfather" existing partnerships. The substance of this complicated rule, as it applies to venture capital partnerships, is that the "fiduciary" question will not
impact the managers of a venture partnership if either (i) "benefit
plan investors" contribute less than twenty-five percent of the partnerships' assets 3 or (ii) the partnership bargains for meaningful
"management rights" vis-A-vis most (at least fifty percent) of the
portfolio companies in which the partnership invests.4
As mentioned above, if the criteria for at least one of the exceptions in the DOL regulation are not satisfied, the general partners of
a venture capital partnership might be viewed for ERISA purposes
as fiduciaries managing plan assets. Generally, this presents
problems in two areas. First, under ERISA, the trustee or other person advising an employee benefit plan is ultimately responsible for
investment of the assets of the plan. If this fiduciary is deemed to
have delegated responsibility to the general partner of a venture capital partnership because its assets are considered "plan assets", the
fiduciary is nonetheiess responsible for the day-to-day supervision of
the investment and management of those assets. Since the fiduciary
for the investing employee benefit plans has no control over the investment and management of assets of the partnership, the fiduciary
for the plan will usually be very reluctant to invest in a limited partnership where the assets of the limited partnership are considered to
be plan assets. Moreover, this may be an impermissible delegation
of, and/or violation of, fiduciary responsibility. Second, limited partnerships generally involve somewhat complicated compensation
2. Department of Labor, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, Employee Benefit Plans: Definition of Plan Assets and Exemption and Alternative Method of Annual Reporting for Plans Investing in Certain Entities, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,262-88 (1986) (codified at 29
C.F.R §§ 2509.75-2, 2510.3-101, 2520.103-12 (1986) and repealing prior § 2550.401b-1).
3. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2510.3-101(f) (1986). A "benefit plan investor" is defined as any of the
following:
(i) Any employee benefit plan .
whether or not it is subject to the provision of Title I of the [ERISA] Act,
(ii) Any plan described in section 4975(e)(i) of the Internal Revenue Code,
(iii) Any entity whose underlying assets include plan assets by reason of a
plan's investment in the entity.
Id. § 2510.3-101(f)(2). See 51 Fed. Reg. 41,262-63 (1986) (discussing adoption of the
definition).
4. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(d) (1986). "Management rights" is defined as "contractual
rights directly between the investor and an operating company to substantially participate in,
or substantially influence the conduct of, the management of the operating company." Id. §
2510.3-101(d)(3)(ii).
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schemes for the general partner as well as for other entities affiliated
with the general partner. Many of these compensation schemes could
be considered "self-dealing" and therefore result in a prohibited
transaction under ERISA.
Due to the adverse consequences that may result from a venture
capital partnership being treated as holding plan assets, partnerships
that desire or anticipate that twenty-five percent or more of the
value of the partnership interests will be held by benefit plans are
likely to seek reasonable assurance that the partnership has obtained
and actually exercises management rights (and otherwise qualifies as
a "venture capital operating company") under the DOL regulation.
The DOL regulation impacts a significant percentage of the total universe of venture partnerships. Pension funds invested about
one-half of the total $1.37 billion dollars committed to all venture
partnerships in the first six months of 1987.1 The issue for new partnerships, especially those that are raising a quarter or more of their
capital from ERISA-governed entities, revolves around the meaning
of the term "management rights."
The DOL regulation sheds little illumination on this issue. It
officially defines "management rights" as "contractual rights . . . to
substantially participate in, or substantially influence the conduct of,
the management of the operating company." 6 The definition represents a tautology that fails to advance one's understanding very far
beyond the original phrase. One example, however, is relatively
clear. If the venture partnership has the right to appoint a director
or officer of the portfolio company, DOL suggests that this right will
be "indicative" (a word practitioners have taken to mean "indicate
conclusively") that "management rights" are involved. 7 Special
rights to inspect books and records and the relative size of the partnership's position in the portfolio company may be "indicative of the
5. See Special Report, 27 VENTURE CAP. J. 7, 9 (1987).
6. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(d)(3)(ii) (1986). See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
7. See 51 Fed. Reg. 41,273 (1986). The DOL discussion lists several examples that commentators on the proposed rule believed "should be treated as indicative of the existence of
management rights." Id. In a related discussion of management rights that are held by syndicates, the DOL notes that
different venture capital investors in a single entity may obtain different kinds of
management rights, For example, in a lead syndication arrangement, the lead
venture capital investor may obtain a contractual right to appoint a member of
the portfolio company's board while other venture capital investors in the syndication may contract for other kinds of management rights.
Id. Since "board seat" power is the DOL's own example, rather than that of commentators, it
thus appears that the DOL shall treat "board seat" power as conclusively "indicative" of management rights.
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existence of management rights," but the question, as DOL's hesitant language suggests, is not free from doubt. 8 Beyond the foregoing, DOL has been silent, leaving lawyers and their clients to wonder
how far a venture partnership must go to avoid running afoul of
ERISA.
If a fund does elect to go forward with twenty-five percent or
more of its capital from pension investors, the safest course is for the
venture partnerships to insist on a director in every company in
which they invest. Indeed, for the partnership to maintain its "management rights," the regulation requires it to "actually exercise" its
rights with respect to at least one portfolio company at least once a
year.9 This exercise must occur in the ordinary course of its business
and not on a sporadic basis. Because a violation of ERISA is a serious matter for fiduciaries, the new funds tend to be cautious. Thus, a
prominent venture capital partner has advised its investors to obtain
a board seat in a majority of the partnership's deals and plans to
exercise the management right frequently. Tony Hoberman of Alliance Capital, a veteran investor in venture funds, also insists on satisfaction of the "board seat" requirement."0 In a recent conversation
he pointed out that, in order to be on the safe side in light of language in the preamble to the Regulation, the partnership should actually exercise its right to a board seat in a "preponderance" of its
investments.
In a given instance, however, there may be problems with the
"board seat" approach. First, venture partnerships tend to enter
financings in packs, usually designating one of their number as the
"lead" investor. Customarily, the lead investor will have the right to
elect a director or two but that right does not extend to all the others
in the investor group. Unfortunately, DOL has taken the position
that the lead investor's rights cannot be shared with other participants." If each syndicate member needs a director, then the board
may become so large as to be unwieldy. In contrast to the boards of
many public companies, the board of a typical venture-backed issuer
is usually a working board, meeting frequently and exercising real
8. Id. Moreover, the weakness of these characteristics as indicative of management
rights is further highlighted by their attribution to commentators on the proposed rule, and not
to the DOL itself. Cf.supra note 7.
9. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(d)(ii) (1986). See 51 Fed. Reg. 41,271 (1986). This requirement shall be referred to as the "once a year" test.
10. See supra note 7.
11. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(d)(3)(ii) (1986) (stating that "management rights" require
contractual rights directly between the investor and operating company). See 51 Fed. Reg.
41,273-74 (1986) (discussing adoption of the rule).
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supervisory authority. A room too full of people, however, rarely accomplishes anything substantive. Decisions may, to be sure, be left to
an executive committee, but the "showcase" directors may incur potential liability if they function as wallflowers on the board. Moreover, if the venture partnership is making later stage investments,
the issuer may not be willing to open up board seats, even to the lead
investor. The board may have jelled by that date with no outsiders
welcome.
If a director-per-investor solution is not in the cards, then the
question becomes what lesser agglomeration of "rights" will constitute "management rights." Examples include: the right to inspect
the financial records; the right to attend directors' meetings although
not to vote; the right to name a director if certain benchmarks are
not met; the right to veto various corporate actions (sometimes referred to as negative covenants); the right to approve management
compensation; pre-emptive rights to purchase additional stock; registration rights and the like. If the purchase agreement between the
venture partnership investor and an operating company is set up
properly, a package can be structured that puts the partnership in
such a strong position vis-A-vis management that counsel to the partnership should be able to opine that the investment qualifies under
the fifty percent test. Furthermore, several of the experienced law
firms in this business are willing to bless a strong basket of rights
even if a directorship is not officially included. 12
Indeed, in some cases, the opinion writing can become quite delicate for other reasons. For offshore investors in venture partnerships, an opinion letter on the management rights issue is sensitive
from a wholly different perspective. If the partnership gets too involved with its portfolio companies, such hyperactivity may imperil
counsel's opinion that, for tax purposes, the partnership (and its
partners) are not engaged in a trade or business in the United
States. Other problems also remain.
As indicated above, there exists the aforementioned caveat in
the Regulation concerning management rights, which insists that the
partnership "actually exercise" its managements rights with respect
to at least one of the portfolio companies at least once a year."3 If
the management right consists of the right to veto management ini12. The author's firm and Carl Kaplan at Reavis & McGrath in New York City are
examples.
13. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(d)(ii) (1986) (the "once-a-year test"). See supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
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tiatives, it can be a powerful right (depending on how many activities are included within the scope of the veto) even though it is never
exercised. Management will consult in advance before taking action,
rather than invite an actual veto. Does the "once a year" test mean
that the parties have to go through the charade of "actually exercising" the veto at some point in each year? Moreover, some rights are,
by their nature, collective - for example, the registration right and
the right to force a public offering of the issuer's securities. Conceivably each investor could have a separate right, 1 but that would be
awkward. Usually, the right is triggered by a stated minimum percentage of the outstanding stock or class of stock. If an investor owns
twenty percent of the company and the trigger is twenty-five percent,
does the fact that the investor needs to obtain at least one ally mean
that the right is a nullity for DOL purposes?
Those in the know predict that DOL is unlikely to offer much in
the way of interpretive advice in the near future, although the staff
has indicated informally that advisory opinions may be available in
particular cases.15 If so, the requisite learning may gradually be built
up by an accretion of the positions taken by the elite law firms in the
area, each looking over the shoulder of the other to see how far various opinion writers are willing to go.

14. See 51 Fed. Reg. 41,273 (1986). See also supra note 7 (quoting DOL example
concerning separate rights).
15. The DOL has issued one advisory opinion, opinion 89-04A, dated March 30, 1989,
concerning qualification as a venture capital operating company under the DOL regulation.

